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Makan No. 256
October, 1980

Official Journal 2/30 Bn. A.I.F. Association

Subscription Rate for Makan for both Life and Annual Members per year: $1.50

Registered for Posting as Periodical: Category A

 

COMMITTEE

Colonel George Ernest Ramsay E.D.

Commanding Officer, 2/30 Bn. A.I.F., from 13/2/1942 until Demobilization (Original Commission in C.M.F. dated 15/7/1921)

Gentleman George - We Salute You

A Humble Tribute from Les Hall

There is no one in this world I admire more than our own “Gentleman George”.

My association with him in P.O.W. life became a very personal thing.

His Army rank demanded deference, the Japs gave it. Under the conditions applying to those of us on "A" Force only a true soldier diplomat could have achieved, what that wonderful veteran did.

He did so much for so many at great risk to himself, but he did it, that those under his command should benefit. They did!

"Gentleman George”....two words with a tremendous wealth of meaning. They signify the man....the soldier....the diplomat.

My first meeting with the second in command of the 2/30 Battalion was at Tamworth, way back in the formative days of the Unit. To merely say, that he impressed me, would be an understatement, as he emanated that "Something" my humble pen fails to express.

It was at Bathurst that I really came to know and to appreciate his greatness his understanding his desire to help, where help was needed most.

The lure of the airwaves tempted me in that bastion of the West and, soon after we arrived there, I somehow "homed" in on 2BS, the only radio station in that city.

So much so the Camp Commandant complained and issued an edict that I be warned against entire evening programmes and the Sunday morning "Diggers' Show"; despite the fact that all my broadcasting efforts were directed towards fund raising and the improvement of amenities within the confines of the camp.

It was then that I came to really know and appreciate the qualities of the one, whom we reverently call "Gentleman George". He interceded on my behalf and cleared me for my continued forays, air wise.

But that was in Australia. In Malaya, at Batu Pahat Camp I "borrowed" town lighting equipment from the local power house thereby providing us of H.Q. Company with many benefits.

However, someone in the red-tape department thought that I had done something wrong, and the wrath of officialdom descended upon my balding pate.

At the subsequent inquiry, held in Johore Bahru, the diplomacy of our one and only 2 i/c succeeded in absolving me from some nasty civil proceedings. The Unit was fined ten shillings per month rental. It was never paid!

Whilst he was acting C.O., in the absence of "Black Jack" on reconnaissance with the Company Commanders and the Brigadier, he showed his tactical ability, when the Battalion was under attack at Fort Rose Estate, near Batu Anum. He was presented with a life or death decision. The tide of battle called for Artillery action, but his last information had been that an Anti-Tank Section with Gun and Ammunition was sited at the junction of the railway and Rubber Estate road, with a section of infantry to provide covering fire, in need. There was no means of communicating with this forward post. It was believed to have been over-run by an enemy patrol. It had certainly been subjected to heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. It was this post, onto which the Artillery fire was to be directed. His problem was, should he defer the Artillery Fire, until he knew for certain that there were no Australians there, or call for Gun Fire.

By his decisive action in calling for Gun Fire there is no question but that he thwarted an enemy attack and that the resultant barrage from 30 Battery, 2/15 Artillery broke up he concentration of Nip troops, staving off the expected attack on the left flank of the Battalion. (Please see pages 37/9. Ed.)

At sea on the 15th May 1942, when the 2/30 Bn. Party with "A" Force on the "Celebes Maru" was heading for Burma, I had reason to be again grateful for his diplomatic ability. On the occasion he literally saved my life, as he did again in another incident in the Mergui, South Burma, Schoolhouse P.O.W. Camp.

My admiration for this man of compassion grew in abundance from that time on. We were under the dominance of one of the toughest Japanese Commandants, whom we were to come up against throughout our P.O.W. Life, Lieutenant TOKORO.

It was at that camp, perhaps more than anywhere else, that his diplomacy was exemplified at its highest peak. He exerted so much pressure on the strutting Nipponese officer, that we of the ranks benefited to a great extent.

But for the efforts of "Gentleman George" I am quite certain that the records of executions and death in consequence of privations, would have been much greater at Mergui and the subsequent jungle camps.

From the 26 kilo Camp to the 75 kilo and to the 105 kilo camp Lieut. Col. G.E. Ramsay E.D., proved beyond any doubt that he was a true soldier, a great commander, and a diplomat of the highest order.

Fear of personal punishment was never his companion. He stood up to the toughest, gave a little, gained a lot. At the 105 kilo Camp admiration for him stemmed from his determination to thwart the Japanese at every turn in their demands for more and more workers.

He held his ground, to such an extent, that he actually forced the Nipponese Area Commandant, Col. Nagatomo, to travel from his headquarters, some eighty kilometres distant, to personally inspect the "many sickmans", who, Lieutenant Colonel G.E. Ramsay and his Medical Officers stated emphatically, were absolutely unfit for any kind of work!

The result.....large groups were transported, or walked the greater part of the distance, to the 55 kilo Camp, at which the "Burma Hospital" had been set up.

That incident, in my opinion, was one of the most outstanding successes attained over the Nipponese by any Force Commander.

My personal regard for "Gentleman George" knows no bounds. I knew him as a Water Board officer as a training and fighting soldier, and under prisoner of war conditions in the exacting privations throughout the length of the Notorious Burma Siam Railway task, and in its primitive, disease ridden camps.

To me he is the epitome of manhood. One, who will never be forgotten, whilst any man, who had the honour to wear the Purple and Gold patches remains alive.

"Gentleman George" I salute you!

Les. G. Hall.

Graham McLeod Travels Memory Lane

I first saw George Ramsay at the 17th Bn. (C.M.F) Drill Hall at North Sydney. It was just after Neville Chamberlain had returned from Munich, proudly waving that scrap of paper, which he misguidedly assured us, promised us Peace in Our Time.

I stress "saw" rather than "met", since privates didn't get much opportunity to hob-nob with Battalion 2 i/cs, as Geo. Ramsay then was. But from a respectful distance, I noted this slim, quietly confident figure, who got things done in the most unobtrusive fashion. It bordered the self-effacing.

But he wasn't really like that, as I discovered following a SNAFU, during one of the militia camps, which I attended quite early in my military career. We'd done some dreary all night stunt (I never could decide whether we'd won or lost) and by dawn we were tired, fed up and hungry. Then the horse-drawn limbers arrived with a flourish, as well as our breakfast, (what else but stew?) but, when the hot-boxes were opened, someone had blundered. No stew. Just Hot Water.

Calmly, George faced the mutinous rumble of discontent. It was an impressive performance. By dint of quiet personality and good humour, in no time, he had us laughing at this debacle instead of marching off indignantly, to lynch the quartermaster.

I learned a lesson that morning. Bellowing wasn't the only way of getting people on side.

Being desperate days, when the Army wasn't in the position to be choosey, I found myself being propelled willy-nilly up the ladder: Corporal, Sergeant, then bafflingly, into the Officers' Mess. It was here that I began to know George better.

At close quarters, I was able to observe him and those things, which were his trademarks....his sleekly groomed dark hair, his ever immaculate turnout, his unruffled good humour and, most of all, that eternal cigarette holder. Without that, George wouldn't have been George.

Then one morning, during the Glenfield Camp, all Officers paraded at the Sydney Showground to join the A.I.F. (As I've mentioned, desperate days, when ability to breathe was enough.)

After that, we scattered. I did a reinforcement course at Studley Park (that's where I met Stuart Peach - very pukkah.....who was the school's 2 i/c.) After that, to Haberfield, training Day-Boys, then to 20 I.T.B. at Wallgrove. This undemanding life ended abruptly when I joined the 2/30 Bn. and I linked up with George once more.

I don't think that he was ever given credit for the way in which he smoothed things for us in Tamworth. "Black Jack", his hands over-full with problems, wasn't at his most patient, and junior subalterns were badly mauled. But George would listen to some white-hot account of imagined injustice, then logically point out how, what had happened, was completely fair, and why. He did a lot to restore battered ego's and confidence.

By the time that we reached Bathurst, we were grasping the hang of this Army business and I was knowing George a lot more intimately. Our cubicles being close, he'd often call in late at night for a quick chat. I needed his boosting, for I was enduring a rugged time, coping with a job, which drew a lot of flak. Each time that door closed behind him, I felt better. He had that effect on me.

George did an excellent PR job for the Battalion both with the people of Tamworth and Bathurst. Largely due to his efforts many doors that otherwise would have remained shut were suddenly opened wide to us.

Pre-Em Leave .... The  Johan....Fremantle...then Singapore. They passed in a blur, then suddenly we were in Birdwood Camp, at Selarang. It was there that George told me of a brief conversation he'd had with his opposite number in the Gordon Highlanders, whilst we watched a ceremonial piping.

From that day, George began having his doubts about Malaya. He'd enquired what the Gordon's did about jungle training and the major eyed him, astonished. "What's the point?" he asked. "Can't see a bloody thing! No field of fiah! Then he turned towards the strutting pipers. "Now, that's REAL soldiering!"

On the way back to Birdwood Camp, George's cigarette-holder was working at full blast....

At Batu Pahat, he and I shared an eerie experience, when a Brahmin, named Mewa Singh, told our fortunes. George went first, emerging with an odd expression. Then it was my turn. Before it was over, the Brahmin asked me how much I was going to pay him? Unhesitantly, I handed over $20, which was a big hunk out of a subaltern's pay. When I asked George, he confessed that he had given the same. There was something fishy here, so we decided that we'd see what "Black Jack" did. The Old Man, although slightly less impetuous, donated ten bucks to a bad cause. That was evidence enough for us. We banned that Brahmin from the camp, to make certain that the ORs weren't milked of their hard-earned dough.

I didn't see much of George during action, until we reached the Causeway. I was with him one day, as the Jap bombers flew high overhead with their loads of bad news for the City of Singapore. With that cigarette holder at the high port, he counted them. "Good God!" he said, "Fifty-four of the bastards!"

Even his Craven A seemed astonished by this show of might.

I wonder how many of us have imagined the thoughts that he might have had in his mind, when he took command of the Unit.

At that time our world was disintegrating into chaos? Our good days were behind us, whilst ahead lay obvious disaster with the possibility of a bloodbath.

Under such circumstances, how would YOU have felt?

I spent the last evening with George the night before he left with "A" Force. I'd managed to acquire some cigarettes... Chuan Hins, I think... and we yarned of old times, smoking until the packet was empty.

Then he was gone, and shortly afterwards I was on my way to Borneo with "B" Force.

"Gentleman George" Ramsay has been to me a dapper, jovial, wise and considerate man. One to whom one could talk about any problem. A very good friend indeed.

Whoever coined his nickname, displayed a flash of rare insight. In its real sense, George. Ramsay was a gentleman, and, I know that that's how those, who had contact with him will always picture him as "Gentleman George".

NX34999 - Colonel George Ernest Ramsay ED

The first thing that comes to mind, when looking back on memories of George Ramsay, is his nickname, "Gentleman George". How proud any one of us would be to be known by a similar sobriquet. Here was a man, who was known as a real gentleman - and renowned as such - by everyone, who knew him and was associated with him, including the men of all ranks in the 2/30 Battalion and a rather wider field in the 8th Division. One needs hardly discourse on the many facets on his character, that went to make him widely known by this nickname - suffice it to say that practically everyone of his friends - especially those of his A.I.F. comrades could tell a personal story of his deep understanding of human needs and his sympathetic way of handling human problems in an unobtrusive way.

In Civilian life, as in the Army, George was always the same and it was said of him there that, to his contemporaries, George Ramsay was classified as a gentleman and friend of the first order.

George was born in East Maitland on 8th January 1899. He was the fourth oldest of a family of nine brothers and sisters. He was educated at East Maitland Superior Public School and at Fort Street Boys' High School later.

Almost immediately after he left school and, when he was only a few months over 17 years of age, on the 1st May 1916, he obtained employment with the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board (the "Water Board" as we call it) in Sydney.

He was already over 14 years of age and, therefore, serving in the Citizen Forces, when the First World War broke out in 1914, but was too young to enlist in the A.I.F. Later on his father was resolute in refusing him permission to join the A.I.F., until, late in 1918, he told him, that he could enlist, as soon as he came home from a camp, which he was attending then at Sydney Showground for a signals course. What irony. The Armistice was signed in France, before that camp was over.

He resumed work with the Water Board and, in his employment with it, he progressed through numerous posts, including appointments as field officer.

He again returned to the Water Board, in April 1946, on his discharge from the 2nd A.I.F. and in the following year, 1947, he became its first Public Relations Officer, and from 24th August 1947 he played a tremendous part in acquainting and enthusing the general public into the importance, necessity and significance of the Warragamba Dam project, which is the key point in Sydney's Water Supply. In those four years was seen a repetition in his civilian duties of a strong initiative and leadership, that he had displayed during his Army service and, in particular the period, when he had the tremendous responsibility for the welfare of so many Prisoners of War on the Burma Siam Railway Line project, on which his men were so compulsorily engaged, as members of "A" Force from Singapore.

George resigned from the Water Board on 1/5/1950, after 34 years service, including war service with it. It had been the obvious choice, that he be selected for a similar position in the Snowy Mountains Hydro Electrical Authority's Project, just then commencing, as its first Public Relations Officer, at first in Sydney, moving his office to Cooma in 1953 and then, transferring to Canberra on 30th November 1955, as the Authority's Representative there, remaining there until his retirement, after 14 years service with it, on 30th September 1964, due to ill health.

He was instrumental in formulating Public Relations Policy within the Authority, but his greatest success was as the Representative in Canberra, where his duties were of the highest diplomatic order. In this position he was well known to the men and women of the Snowy.

After the First World War George remained in the Citizen Forces and, when his compulsory period of service was ended, he continued as a volunteer serviceman. His first Commission was dated 15th July 1921 and promotions to Captain and Major occurred, as he continued to make this service his part time hobby. When war broke out in September 1939, he was a Major and 2 i/c to Lt. Col. F.G. Galleghan in the 17th Battalion, the North Sydney Regiment. Early in 1940 he was appointed Brigade Major to the 9th Brigade C.M.F. In the middle of that year he joined the A.I.F. as 2 i/c, 2/20 Battalion (Lt. Col. W. Jeater being it’s Commanding Officer).

On 9th November 1940 Lt. Col. Galleghan was informed that he had been appointed to form and command 2/30 Battalion A.I.F. within 27th Brigade. He, on that same day, telephoned George Ramsay and asked him, if he would join him as Battalion 2 i/c, which he did. Major Noel McGuffie Johnston, who had also served under Lt. Col. Galleghan in the 17th Battalion, was another, who was asked to join the other two, and had accepted, and thus it was that the 2/30 Battalion A.I.F. had perhaps a greater element of experience at its helm, than was normal in an A.I.F. Battalion. A C.O. who had seen service in 1914/18 in France and had served continuously in the Militia between the two Wars, a Battalion 2 i/c having nearly 20 years in commissioned rank (and already qualified by examinations for Lt. Colonel) and the next senior Major with 15 years in commissioned rank.

Although the 9th November 1940 had been a Sunday, George Ramsay left Sydney on the following Wednesday, 13th November, for Tamworth, together with Captain Alan Pryde as Quartermaster and Captain John Taylor as Medical Officer to institute initial preparations in the setting up of the Quarters for the reception of the drafts of men from Training Camps with the least delay in the Tamworth Showground.

At the Causeway positions on Singapore Island on 9/2/42, George Ramsay was appointed to temporary command of the Bn., as "Black Jack" had been ordered to hospital, whilst attending a conference at Brigade H.Q., because the heavy Japanese shelling over the several days, preceding their landings, had caused him to suffer a deafness through the effects of concussion upon an old wound in his left ear sustained in World War 1. The thought was for, him to have treatment and a medical boarding repatriating him to Australia. The tide of battle however was such that Lt. Col. Galleghan would not stay in hospital, but had himself discharged and reported for duty again, whereupon he was detailed for special duties in Singapore, "Gentleman George" was promoted to the rank of Lieut. Colonel and was appointed to command of the 2/30 Bn as from 13th Feb, 1942.

In order to remain with the 2/30 Bn George had earlier declined a promotion and appointment to command the 2/26 Bn, a position, which had become vacant. Thus it was that George commanded the Battalion in the difficult process of the withdrawal from the Causeway on 10th Feb, firstly to an area north of Bukit Mandai, where the road junction, Woodlands-Mandai Roads, had to be held. On the next day further withdrawals were necessary on account of the infiltrations of advanced forces from Japanese, pressing forward from the Kranji Mandai area. However, although the first time for the Battalion to be followed in a withdrawal, the Japanese efforts were ineffective causing them more losses than they inflicted.

The tide and flow of battle movements stopped other Units reaching rendezvous points and Lt. Col. Ramsay marched the Battalion eastwards across country to Upper Thomson Road near to Nee Soon, a distance of 7 miles being covered in the day. At this time the 27th Brigade had been attached to the 11th Indian Division, providing cover to its Units in their withdrawals. Then the Battalion was attached to the 53rd Brigade, 18th Division, and reverted to A.I.F. control on taking up its position in the final defence perimeter in the grounds of Tyersall Palace.

George Ramsay marched out to Selarang Barracks at Changi with the 2/30 Bn and administered command of it as from the commencement of incarceration, but, in March, Lt. Col Oakes, C.O. of 2/26 Bn A.I.F., who had been selected to command a detachment of 2000 A.I.F. personnel, which was required by the Japanese to be quartered at Adam Park, a suburb of Singapore, for the purpose of building a shrine, was ill on the scheduled date of departure of this party and, as a result of medical advice to the effect that he should not move from Changi for a least 3 or 4 weeks, Lt. Col. Ramsay was sent to Adam Park and assumed command there until such time as Lt. Col. Oakes should be well enough.

A few days after arrival there a further detachment of troops from several U.K. Regiments under Lt. Col. Madden R.A. were marched in and added to his command, which then totalled, together with some smaller detachments, over 3000 all ranks.

He was there until about one month later, when Lt. Col. Oakes relieved him and he returned to Changi.

The housing at Adam Park consisted of two hutted camps, one of which accommodated about 600 A.I.F., the other about 600 British, whilst the remainder of the party were in unoccupied private residences.

In the beginning Working Parties were formed up on a general parade each morning and, in accordance with Jap requirements, were divided into 4 or 5 groups and marched off at 0900 hours under their own officers with Japanese guides.

George complained to the Japanese over this method, which created confusion for his administrative staff in knowing where their men were. He had the Japanese change to supplying a list of men and tools required each day on the previous evening, and so allowing of the sick being kept in off the work.

By 22/4/42 the Senior M.O. reported that 4 out of 5 suspected Beri Beri cases had been sent back to Changi and that their illnesses indicated a lack of Vitamin B in the diet which was made up of: Rice 20oz per man per day; Sugar 0.44oz; Flour 1.40 oz; Tea 0.05 oz; Milk 0.85; M & V 1 oz, with fresh meat dependent upon the available supply. He also reported that the ration issue was entirely deficient in Vitamin C, and whilst no cases of scurvy were apparent at the time, he was of the opinion that the deficiency was showing itself in the various skin conditions, which were becoming more frequent among the troops.

George's return to Changi allowed him to report on these conditions of the Working Party to Senior A.I.F. Command.

Over this period and during a time when Brigadier Maxwell had had a bout of sickness, "Black Jack" had had temporary command of the 27th Brigade; but on 1st May he relinquished his duties as acting brigadier to Brig. Maxwell, then recovered, and "Gentleman George" having been asked to take over command of 2/18 Battalion and agreeing to do so, leaving the command of 2/30 Bn vacant, "Black Jack" returned to its command, as having been left with no command appointment at all at the time of the capitulation.

The resultant "physical" reinstatement of Lt. Col. Galleghan was due entirely to "Gentleman George's" understanding of his former C.O.'s strong sentiments of personal relationship with the 2/30 Bn, which had become known as "Galleghan's Greyhounds", and the strong bond of loyalty, which had always existed between them. This dual relationship continued over the subsequent years after the War, until "Black Jack’s" death on 20th April 1971, despite that George was the official C.O. ever since his elevation to the command in February 1942. The Army H.Q. in Australia did not recognise the 2/18 Bn transfer in any way whatsoever, all records there showing 2/30 Bn throughout.

Your scribe has been granted the privilege of reading what Col Ramsay wrote in 1942 as a forward to a book, which one of the men with him on "A" Force had hoped to have published on his return to Australia, but which, by reason of circumstances, has not been made available to the general public, and where he said, "At the time of writing I am still a Prisoner of War and am at present quartered at Mergui, Lower Burma. Although I still hope that, it will be possible for Col. Galleghan to add, at least, some message before this book is published, I must confess that, I did welcome the opportunity thus afforded me, of placing on record my own personal tribute, not only to the Commanding Officer himself, with whom I had been so closely fated, as his 2 i/c, both in the 17th Battalion, Militia (The North Sydney Regiment) and the 2/30 Battalion, A.I.F. and for whom I could have nothing but the highest regard, affection and admiration as a soldier of the first order; but also to the magnificent response, made by Officers and men alike, to the demands which I made upon them when, in the latter stage of the campaign on Singapore Island, Brigadier D.S. Maxwell MC sent Colonel Galleghan to hospital on account of a severe aggravation of an injury, received in the last war, and the mantle of a Commanding Officer fell on my shoulders.

There were so many splendid fellows of all ranks, that it is impossible to record some names, without doing an injustice to many others, equally deserving, but I feel that I could be pardoned, if I do mention my second in command, Major Noel Johnston (as he then was), who did such excellent work throughout and was a tower of strength to me in my new appointment.

For my part, I am ever mindful of the whole hearted cooperation, accorded to me at all times by Officers, N.C.O.'s and Men alike, whether recorded or unrecorded; more especially perhaps, during the short period, in which I held, what was to me, an honoured position as their Commanding Officer.

I cannot speak too highly of their services, while their courage and loyalty will forever remain a treasured memory, to which Kipling's great lines are applicable:

It ain't the individual,
Or the Army as a whole,
But the everlastin' teamwork
Of every bloomin' soul.

I am well aware that any military failure must be the subject of much discussion and criticism, from both informed and ill-informed sources, but, whether the final verdict of future historians on the conduct of the Malayan Campaign by higher command, is one of approval or of censure, I am convinced, that the presence in Malaya of the 8 Australian Division, with its attached troops, was a big contributory factor in causing a postponement at least of a Japanese invasion of Australia; in so much as it helped materially, inter alia, in allowing additional time for troops, planes and equipment from the United States of America to become firmly established there; and I have been informed since by Japanese Officers, that some of their troops were diverted from other theatres of operations, which more readily may have threatened Australia, in order to overcome firstly the resistance of the forces in Malaya, which was a necessary prelude to any large scale attack on our homeland.

I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying to all members of the 2/30 Battalion that, although we are all keenly disappointed at our failure to hold Singapore, you, in common with members of many other individual units, A.I.F., English, Scottish and Indian, have every reason to feel proud of your achievement, and have proved yourselves worthy of your Regimental Motto 'Play the Game'.'

On the Regimental Colour of the 30 Bn is emblazoned in letters of gold, a list of Battle Honours, won by the men of the first 30 Battalion A.I.F. in the war of 1914-18, symbolizing deeds of valour; and lives given for King and Country and for the honour of their Regiment; and I have no doubt that, when, perhaps amongst others, a scroll bearing the name of "Gemas" is added to this list, it will be accepted by those earlier 30 Bn. warriors, as worthy of its honoured place, and as adding fresh lustre to the purple and gold rectangle, which has been worn now in two Wars.

I feel that I would be tried and found wanting in appreciation and, more than likely, would incur also the displeasure of most of the original members of the Battalion, were I to fail to pay tribute, on their behalf, to the sterling services of the many friends, who did much to assist the Unit, in so many different ways, both before leaving Australia and since.

In conclusion, to those gallant women whose menfolk - our own true comrades of proved loyalty and courage - have been out off in the flower of their splendid young manhood by the tragedy of war, I can only say, in the words of those immortal lines.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old,
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn,
At the going down of the Sun, and in the Morning,
We will remember them."

July 1942

(At the time, of writing the above lines, Colonel Ramsay was still a P.O.W. and quartered at Mergui, Lower Burma and although some may question his knowledge of events, which took place in other spheres of action, whilst he was still a P.O.W. it must be remembered that he was one of those in command, who fostered the use of the illicit wireless sets, so as to keep the morale of the troops with him sustained by dissemination of news, which they were able to accept as correct thereby stopping idle rumour, as evidenced by the following report.

It was at the camp at Kun Knit Kway (26 Kilo Peg) on the evening of Christmas Eve 1942, Lt. Col Ramsay gave a short talk to the 1500 odd members of “Ramsay” Force and “Black” Force in the presence of a number of Japanese Guards, and, because they were there, couched his address in the form of a parable, but he felt that he had to get his message to the men, in order to sustain their morale, since it was regarding the dissemination of news, received on a radio set being operated by a Leading Aircraftsman of the R.A.A.F. with one or two assistants.

George said that, “the Brigadier, commanding "A" Force, had passed through this camp immediately prior to George's arrival to take over as Senior Allied Officer there, and had ordered the use of a secret radio set to be discontinued, in view of the certain torture or death, or both, that would be meted out to all those, who might be directly or indirectly connected with its operation, should it be discovered".

From experience in previous camps, however, I knew that, the only real effective check to the detrimental effect on the morale of all ranks caused by the untraceable, wild and unfounded rumours, which constantly circulated, would be the receipt of authentic news, however meagre.

I therefore at the earnest request of those prepared to operate the set, agreed to its continuance, but at this early stage we became more expert later - it was essential that all Ps.O.W., who were to benefit by the service, should thoroughly understand the very real danger, to which those responsible, were exposing themselves, in order that the risks be in no way increased unnecessarily, by idle curiosity as to the whereabouts of the set.

I had obtained permission from the Japs, at the request of Padre Mathieson, for him to hold an evening 'Fiery Cross' Service for the whole camp on Christmas Eve, and I decided to take advantage of this gathering, so that I could be sure that all troops got the same message at the same time, in order to avoid confusion, that could be caused by some hearing it before others by less direct channels through their Company and Platoon Commanders.

Although I have a vivid recollection of the occasion, I did not commit my talk to paper at the time, but have endeavoured to reproduce it as faithfully as I can remember.

"I have assembled you here, this evening, to give you a message of good cheer, despite the conditions, in which we find ourselves, but first of all I want to give you a message of a different sort, which closely affects everyone of you.

In this season of the year, it is quite fitting that, I should talk to you in the form of a parable, but there is one more potent factor, which makes this necessary, and that is the presence among us this evening of guests of type and race that are not normally included in our list of invitations to our festive gatherings.

I understand that you have been in the habit of hearing a little bird singing in this camp, but that, coinciding with my arrival to take command here, its song was no longer heard. I am given to understand, that this is attributed to me, but I can assure you, that is not the case. I do not think my friends would recognise in me one, who has any particular influence with our little feathered friends, but I think, in this instance, that I may be able to assist the bird, of whom you are so fond, to sing once more.

This, however, is dependent upon certain conditions, the first of which is that this bird, which sings with a clear true note, is very timid, and any attempt on the part of any one of you to locate its nest, may cause it to cease singing, altogether. Any discussion of the tune it sings may also have the same result.

The bird, to which I refer, is a nightingale, and must not be confused with the note of another bird, which is of Australian origin, named the lyre bird. This may not be spelt the same way, but it has the same meaning. As you know, it is a mimic and reproduces anything, that it might hear, if it be that there is any foundation for it or not? If there is any doubt in your mind at any time, as to whether the song, which you are hearing, is from the nightingale or the lyre bird, any one of your officers - who are all keen bird lovers - will be able to set you right. If you observe these conditions rigidly, and do not go on any bird-nesting expeditions, I feel confident that the results will be to everyone's satisfaction.

Upon an evening, such as this Christmas Eve, our hearts go out to our dear ones at home, and we can only hope and trust that this will be the last Christmas, in which we find ourselves in such a position. I know that your spirit is such that it does not sound so ludicrous, as it might appear, when I wish you all a Merry Christmas.

"A" Force was the first established and, by far the group longest to endure the turmoils of the Burma-Siam Railway ordeal. For almost 3½ years Colonel Ramsay was the Senior officer of a highly diversified group of Allied personnel, who had become Ps.O.W.; Australian, British, Dutch, American, and Indonesians. In jungle working camps, in which he was the go between and spokesman/representative of 1000 or more men, almost all of whom were, by our civilian standards, utterly unfit for even the lightest work, Col. Ramsay did a fantastic job in mediations with the Japanese Army Commandants. He had a wonderful aptitude for assessing just when it was appropriate to concede a demand made by the Japanese or to press for a concession for the men under him. His was a splendid balance of "Give this way, get something in another direction." "Gentleman George" earned for himself a magnificent reputation as a capable and sympathetic leader of Australians in the face of terrible adversity. The story was one of the first to be published in a book, after the war ended, its name being, "Behind Bamboo" and its author, Rohan D. Rivett; publishers, Angus & Robertson, Sydney.

Those of the original "A" Force, which had left Singapore to sail to Burma in the stifling tramp-ship conditions, and were members of the 2/30 Battalion Party, who survived, with "Gentleman George", until the final capitulation of the Japanese on 15th August 1945, were aware only too well of the tremendous part that he played in helping them to come through the appalling conditions of the jungle work camps, which extended over so long a period. There is no doubt in the minds of those who came through both the active service fighting and the Prisoner of War experience that Colonel Ramsay's leadership and diplomatic approaches were of extraordinary significance to them.

Cornel Lumiere in his book, "Kura!", at page 6, wrote of problems of the officers. "In the early days of captivity it became clear, that those, who were willing and able to accept responsibility, would do so, regardless of their rank. Some officers were put to death because they stood up for their men.

In many instances men of other ranks proved to have the character, courage and intelligence necessary in a leader. They inspired their fellow prisoners and often managed to improve their lot. To them responsibility was a challenge. Neither, risk nor personal hardship could affect their effort to achieve the impossible. It was quite clear that George Ramsay was distinguished by his inclusion amongst those who fought for his men, both by continual conference with the Japanese Camp Commanders and by written submissions through them to the Japanese POW Administration Headquarters.

Colonel Ramsay's command on "A" Force was that of No.1 Battalion, comprising 850 all ranks of A.I.F. personnel, as it was formed and when it left Selarang Barracks on 14th May 1942.

The 2/30 Bn provided 98 men in this No. 1 Battalion; Capt Pryde was his 2 i/c, and both they and Lieuts. Farr and Kreckler who were platoon Commanders, were included in that figure of 98.

The men in the other two Battalions were mostly from the 22nd Brigade and Divisional Units, and the Commander of all of "A" Force was Brig. A.L. Varley MC.

"A" Force requirements of Japanese originally called for a force of 6000 A.I.F. personnel to proceed by sea for an unknown destination. The number was later reduced to 3000, after the Japs were informed that the higher number would necessitate return of some members of Singapore Work Parties. Also, when told that the reduced number still would require men whom M.O.'s regarded as unfit, A.I.F. HQ was told that, as it was not a working party, temporary illnesses would not constitute any hardship or inconvenience. One of the Japanese lies.

Another lie was that all members of this Force would be sent to one destination. Permission to take any tools, medical supplies and other equipment was refused and an assurance given by the Japs, that all such facilities would be available upon arrival at their new quarters. This in actual fact proved incorrect in every detail.

No.1 Bn "A" Force of 850 men, plus a Medical Detachment of a further 150, was loaded on S.S. "Celebes Maru" and Brigadier Varley and the remainder of "A" Force embarked on S.S. "Toyohashi Maru". All ranks were quartered in the holds of the two ships, and, in the case of the "Celebes Maru", it was possible to allow only half the number on deck at any one time, and this was permitted only after strong representations had been made to the Japanese on board. The conditions were appalling and made worse at Medan in Sumatra on the way, when 350 Japanese Troops were also embarked on the "Celebes Maru", which meant that a number of the Ps.O.W. were forced to go deeper into the hold.

The Force was landed at three different points, about 150 miles between each on the West Coast of Southern Burma, 1000 all ranks under Maj. Green and hence known as "Green Force" at Victoria Point. Another detachment went ashore at Mergui. This group totalled 1500 men and was comprised of the 850 No.1 Bn. of A.I.F., 80 of the Medical Detachment, 70 of Aus. Engineers and 500 British from Sumatra, these last being members of British Regular and Territorial Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, many of the Naval men being survivors from H.M. Ships, "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse". All these at Mergui came to be known as "Ramsay Force".

Brig. Varley, with the remaining 1000 A.I.F., was landed at Tavoy. All three parties were cut off from all communication with each other.

No arrangements had been made for the reception of the Ps.O.W. at Mergui; the entire 1500 were housed in a school, that could have been capable of accommodating from 600/800 in reasonable comfort.

Col. Ramsay reported, that a number of the U.K. Troops had dysentery, as well as a number of Australians, who had developed this and other illnesses during the very trying journey. The sanitary conditions were hopeless. Within a couple of weeks after repeated protests, the sick were allowed to be moved to a wing of a local Burmese hospital under the care of my own medical officers, and, later still, we were removed to a new camp, which, I was informed, had been built for Japanese Troops, and which was easily the most comfortable of any quarters we had at any time during the whole period as P.O.W.

The rice generally was of poor quality, but on the completion of baker’s ovens, erected by our own troops, with the permission of the Nipponese better use was made of the Flour, which made possible the issue of a small bun per man for 1 meal daily.

Permission was granted for holding of regular concerts and band recitals for the entertainment of the troops.

Facilities were extended to me and Capt. Hence, 2/18 Bn. and my Adjutant, to purchase such drugs and other medical supplies and extra special foods, as were available in the village for the benefit of hospital patients, from Red Cross and other private funds, which were at our disposal, (Advances of approx. 4000 rupees were made available to us by one or two of the local residents, without the knowledge of the Japanese and administration of these funds was in the hands of Mr. K.M. Bostock, the Aust. Red Cross Representative, who was a P.O.W. with "A" Force).

Permission was granted to me to deal with breaches of discipline within the camp area, without the offenders having to be handed over to Nipponese authorities for punishment.

A copy of a Message to the Troops at Mergui on 2/8/42 is indicative of his character and methods. At the time he had committed it to writing and was able to bring it back with him. It reads:

"My aim ever since arrival here has been to spare no effort to improve the conditions with a view to helping you bodily and mentally, so that, as many of you as possible, will be fit, either to take your place again in the fighting services or to return to your home in full health and strength, whichever fate may have in store for us. In order to accomplish this, I have adopted the policy of deferring to Japanese authority in minor things, concentrating in making a definite stand on more vital cases, such as where men's lives or health are at stake. I do not claim to have been 100% successful, but I am convinced that this has resulted in providing many amenities for the benefit of the majority in the difficult circumstances, in which we at present find ourselves, which would not have been available to us, had any other course been adopted. There are many things I do not like, of course, any more than you do, such as having to use Japanese words of command, etc., but I regard these more in the nature of pin pricks and not sufficiently vital, on which to base an issue at the risk of endangering our other concessions, as after all, we are not yet in a position to dictate terms.

The Japanese Commander has now informed me that he has received instructions from his H.Q. at Tavoy.

1. That any prisoner of war outside the Camp area for any purpose, whatsoever, without authority, will be treated as an escapee and shot, as has happened already in one case a few days ago.

2. That no excuse will be accepted, and that any representations made by myself or staff will be useless.

As a result of much persistent effort on the part of myself, with the able assistance of my adjutant, Battalion Commanders and other officers, who are constantly making suggestions for your comfort, a number of concessions of real benefit have been obtained.

Every effort is being made still to increase the available supplies of fruit and eggs, but even as it stands, this has been of tremendous advantage and there is little excuse now for a man risking his life for a few extras. If some of you pride yourself in the belief that you are too smart to be ever caught, then I say, that it is grossly unfair to your people

at home, for any of you, to risk your life and the happiness of your people for so little. Each further offence also endangers such benefits, as we have been able to obtain, for the majority and hampers our efforts towards trying to obtain more.

We also have a duty to local inhabitants. The Burmese Police have increased their vigilance considerably and tightened their restrictions, thus increasing the risk, and I am informed that a native, only a day or two ago, was placarded and beaten in the streets with sticks, and others have been arrested, for handing cheroots to some of you fellows; while, I am informed that, at Tavoy, a native caught giving food to Ps.O.W. was thrashed and then sentenced to 5 years gaol.

It has been thought by some, that 2 or 3 men, who were put in our guard room here, were placed under Japanese sentries, voluntarily by my orders. Nothing is further from the truth. The Japanese sentries took control because your own N.C.Os and men on guard failed to do their job. The Japanese, themselves, found these men, who should have been in the guard room, roaming about the grounds.

Our own guards, through misguided sense of comradeship, instead of rendering these offenders a service, rendered not only them, but the rest of you, a great disservice by failing to realise their responsibility to me and to what I am trying to do.

Some of these offenders in the guard room were found guilty of stealing from their comrades and nobody has been sentenced for detention there without my hearing the whole of the evidence personally and being satisfied in my own mind, that the punishment, which I awarded, was deserved.

Discipline is essential in any phase of life you care to mention. If you were to start out to form a club of any sort, sporting or otherwise, you would immediately start drafting a set of rules and regulations for the guidance and control of your own members. In Service Units, as we are still, even the Ps.O.W. it is not practicable for decisions to be made by popular vote. I have been given the responsibility by Malaya Command and A.I.F. HQ. for the welfare and safety of the troops here, and no one can relieve me of that responsibility, therefore, within the limitations imposed by the Japanese, the final decisions must be mine; but, when a matter arises, on which I have an open mind, and which affects you all personally, I have invited your representatives on two occasions to a conference, in order that I may hear your views and suggestions, to which I have given the fullest consideration; and I must say that, I have appreciated the attitude of cooperation adopted by your representatives on these occasions.

I hate Orderly Rooms, and there are few things I dislike more than having to sentence a man for some offence against rules, which are framed for the good of the Force, as a whole, but in some cases I have been forced to take this action.

I deplore the dissemination of exaggerated or unfounded stories. On one occasion, on it being reported to me that, one of the men in the guard room was being beaten by Japanese, my Adjutant and myself were in the guard room within two minutes of hearing this report, prepared, if necessary, to immediately see the Japanese Commander, only to find that there was no truth whatsoever in the allegations made.

With the invaluable assistance of my Adjutant, I have been able to save five men in this camp from being shot. So long as I felt that it was in my power to save you from such an extreme penalty I have always been reluctant to deny you any privileges, which you are able to obtain for yourselves, provided that, in doing so, you did not endanger the privileges of the remainder, or act in such a manner as would bring discredit upon your own self-respect and the prestige, which we have enjoyed as Britishers.

Now that I feel that any representations, which I may make in order to save a man's life would meet with little, if any success, I would be failing in my duty to you, and to those at home who care for you, who are eagerly awaiting your return, and who perhaps are dependant upon you, did I not take some definite action.

Even should the British or Australian Governments take some future action, that would be of no use for them man who had been shot, and afford little consolation to his family.

I have decided, therefore, that strong disciplinary action will be taken against any man found attempting to leave this area, or the hospital area, without proper authority; and also against any member of a guard, who fails to do his duty in this respect.

I feel that this decision is quite consistent with my original aim, which I mentioned earlier, and I always prefer to make an appeal to men's decency, rather than to threaten them. To my mind, this matter is so vital and affects all, that I do appeal, therefore, to those appointed for guard duty from time to time, to do your job conscientiously; and to the remainder of you to co-operate by not making any more difficult than it is, the job of your officers or of the guards appointed by me for the good of all.

In Aug. 1942 Lt. Col. Ramsay and his men were moved to Tavoy. The Detachment under his command comprised the 1500 in "Ramsay Force", which he had had at Mergui, less one Company and less the Medical detachment and the sick, giving a residue of 1100, plus effective workers from "Green Force", originally landed at Victoria Point, lower Burma, No. 3 Bn "A" Force, plus its Medical and R.A.E. detachments from "A" Force Headquarters, reduced from the original 1000 to 600 under the command of Maj. C.E. Green, Commanding 2/4 M.G. Bn, plus a Dutch party of 200 from N.E.I. so that his "Ramsay Force" then totalled 1900. The main part was quartered at the Tavoy High School, with one Company at the Aerodrome. Brigadier Varley and that part of "A" Force, which had landed originally at Tavoy, were also at the aerodrome but communication between the aerodrome and the school was not permitted officially. However George Ramsay managed to contact Brigadier Varley at the Tavoy Hospital, which was available to the sick from both camps.

In Dec. 1942, Lt. Col. Ramsay was in command of a detachment of 1700 in all, of whom there were but 900 of his original number, still with the 200 Dutch party, and an additional 200 from "Black Force", which was another party from Java under the command of Lt. Col. C.M. Black, 2/3 Res. M.T. Coy, and made up of personnel from A.I.F., R.A.N. and R.A.A.F. plus some 200 U.S. Navy and Army personnel. Their camp was now at Kun Knit Kway, at the 26 kilo, on the Railway construction.

Rohan D. Rivett's Book on "A" Force, "Behind Bamboo" relates at p 188, "At the 26 Kilo Mark, Kwun Knit Kway, we were joined in the middle of December by nearly 1000 Australians from Tavoy under Lt. Col. George Ramsay of 2/30 Bn; as the Senior Officer now, he became C.O., but Black Force and Ramsay Force retained their own administration. He gives an opinion also at page 191 "The doctors were under continual pressure from the Japanese to send out as many men as possible to maintain the strength of the working parties. Colonel Ramsay, Colonel Black, their adjutants, Captain Arthur Hence and Captain Ron Winning, and the doctors attached to the two groups, fought the Japanese tooth and nail to prevent sick and convalescent men being hounded out to toil for ten (10) and twelve (12) hour shifts under the broiling, enervating rays of the tropical sun.

His men from Dec. '42 to March '43 were at the 26 Kilo Camp (Kun Knit Kway). From March '43 to May '43 they were at the 75 Kilo Camp at Meiloe and from May '43 to December '43 at the 105 Kilo Camp at Aunggananaung (or "Ankanan" as it came to be called) (Three Pagoda Pass).

He has said, "It was during this period from Dec '42 to Dec ‘43 that the greatest hardships, including exhausting manual labour for long hours; ill treatment by Korean and Japanese railway troops; lack of adequate food, medical supplies and accommodation, were experienced by the troops under my command."

My policy of never admitting to being able to supply a full quota, as demanded by the Japanese, had at least some effect and never voluntarily, did I supply them with the full number they required, as this I knew, would result in an increased number subsequently. By this restriction of the Japanese demands we were able to keep within the Camp many very sick men, who would otherwise, certainly, have been sent to work.

Copies of claims, that he made to the Japanese Engineers in control of the work, and which he was able to retain and bring back with him, when he was recovered, on his inability to supply enough men, who were physically fit to do the hard work required of them, show that he laid the blame on the Japanese, initially, because they had declared that the fact that this "A" Force would have to be made up from men not considered fit enough to have been sent on the earlier Singapore Work Parties; some sent back from those parties, as being unable to stand up to continuous, strenuous work, also sick men, men suffering from war wounds, recently discharged from hospital; also a number above normal military age, and yet the Japanese had stated that the fact that they were not fully physically fit, would not constitute any real disadvantage, as the force would not be required as a Working Party.

Colonel Ramsay also pointed out, that:

"The Troops from Java included a large number of members of a Motor Transport Unit, who, apart from being well above the normal military age, were subject to a far less stringent military examination than other soldiers.

The Changi Men's health had been affected by the incidence of dysentery amongst the British Troops from Java, resulting in the whole camp suffering a severe epidemic of dysentery, which had been difficult to combat because of the paucity of medical supplies that were available to his medical officers in Burma, added to the refusal to allow the Force to bring medical supplies from Singapore, and that prolonged lack of drugs and medicines had allowed many ailments to become more deep seated, so that improvement in these cases had become slower than if it had been possible to treat them properly earlier.

His Medical Officers were conducting a thorough medical examination of all doubtful cases and compiling a list of those, who could be considered as being physically incapable of doing the hard work, which was required on the railroad, or to whom the risk of permanent injury to heart etc. would be too great.

If the food availability could be improved, so that the troops could have eggs and other items, with which to augment the then existing issue ration, that provides a diet, to which Australians are unaccustomed, it would be of considerable assistance in maintaining the daily quota. (Of course this, it turned out, was possible only before the work force entered into the jungle, since after that they were no longer in touch with native villages, from whence the extra foods were obtainable.)

He felt that more men could be provided daily, if the working periods were reduced from nine consecutive working days to six consecutive days.”

This complaint was followed up by another ten days later stating that he and his officers were finding it impossible to find enough troops to be fit and strong enough to do such hard work for more than a few days together on the Railway.

He sought to have the number of men required each day to be reduced to between 650 and 700 per day, since out of 1550 men in the camp less than 1200 were available for railroad work before making any allowances for the large number of daily sick of about 500 per day, constantly at that figure because it included a large number of men with sore feet, ulcers on legs and feet, and tinea of the crutch, which made it impossible for them to work or even walk for any distance, plus about 180 men aged 40 years and over.

Another complaint, which he had to make, was over a continual shortage of rations between the amounts, which the Jap soldiers claimed that they were delivering and the amounts, as checked, and actually received in camp. The worst aspect of the Japanese confiscations, which he complained about, was the habit of taking one half of one of the animals each day for themselves regardless of whether it was 1 animal or 5 animals killed for the whole camp of Ps.0.W. of approx. 2000, against the 50 or so Japanese, including Ps.O.W. with them as kitchen assistants, or as they called them, "Duty Men".

A Dutch Interpreter, "Cor" Punt, who had been accepted by Brigadier Varley at his "A" Force Headquarters after arrival in Burma, under the pseudonym of "Cornet Lumiere" gives a few word pictures of "Gentleman George" in his book, "Kura!", published by The Jacaranda Press Pty. Ltd., 1966.

At p. 18. "With his calm and soft voice, which hid a great deal of will power and conviction, Colonel Ramsay tried to convey at every opportunity - and there were many - that civilised people did not beat others with a stick or a rifle butt but fact remains that, on many occasions, his mere presence tempered an angry Korean or Japanese guard's wrath."

At p.118/9. (An example is given of an incident at the 105 Kilo Camp at Aungganaung, where Colonel Ramsay showed evidence of his diplomatic ways, even though in this case there were repercussions) "with a typical twist of the Japanese mind the captor decided to film the new rail link between Rangoon and Bangkok for making of a movie depicting the happy white workers setting out for another day of work the......the Aussies were to sing a martial song as they passed the gate. They marched but nary a word could be heard by the Jap handling the sound track. But the chaps were in no mood to "come on". Sullenly they marched out the second time, no song, not a note! Back into camp once again, under a rain of "Kura's" and abusive Jap shouts.

Colonel Ramsay, who had been watching the entire procedure with disgust and growing doubt, went over just in time to stop one of the men from getting a rifle butt over his head from one of the guards.

“Listen men," the Colonel began, "I fully understand and agree with your sentiment, but the entire camp is going to suffer the consequences unless the Japs order is obeyed. Now there are ways and means to please our hosts. Here is what you can do......”

As the Colonel explained, what he had in mind, there was an immediate change in the attitude of the troops. There were laughs.

This time, when the sign for a marching song was given the movie makers got it. They got it with full force, with great feeling. Captain Hence waved to the officer in charge of the work party, indicating that the men should stop repeating over and over again the refrain here, for delicate eyes, identified as: "Bless'm all, Bless'm all "

As so often happened, however, the Japs had the last word. As the order went out and the officers appeared on the parade ground, a Jap sergeant with four Korean guards marched up. With him were two of the Tokyo movie group, carrying a tape recorder....the Jap sergeant gave the order.....There was no margin left for stalling this time. As the four guards stood around the officers, bayonets at the ready, the "Choir" sang! Colonel Ramsay conducted!"

A letter dated 1 June 43 from Colonel Ramsay to the Jap. Chief of No.3 Branch, Thai War Prisoners' Camps, Lt. Col. Nagatomo, written at "Ankanan" (Aungganaung) "Three Pagoda Pass Camp or 105 Kilo Camp, is repeated here in part, and further shows Colonel Ramsay's fight on behalf of his men.

My fears expressed 12/3/43, that, with the continuance of such conditions, as then were being experienced, the health of my troops would be still further adversely affected, has been confirmed, as my M.O.’s now state that the troops here are in a worse state of health than at any time since we have been Ps. 0. W.

This is partly due to the long hours worked during the last days of our stay at Meiloe, when men had to work all day and the greater part of the night, followed by a particularly arduous march to 105 Kilo Camp.

I recognise that the numbers required for daily working parties by the Nipponese Commander here, would be most reasonable in normal circumstances, but I respectfully submit that the present conditions are far from normal, as the continuous working in the rain and on wet and slippery ground makes that work doubly arduous. This is further aggravated by their long continuous working periods, as a rest day every 10th day seems to have been discontinued. The very high sick rate is almost impossible of reduction and, in fact, must become worse, so long as the Nipponese Staff at this camp are permitted to send men out to work against the advice of my Medical Officers.

The fact remains that some men are being sent out to work, whose health is being seriously, perhaps permanently, affected.

My Medical Officers advise that there are many cases of diarrhoea in the camp at present and that these need careful watching as, with some cases of cholera already in our midst, they are more liable to contract this dread disease, if their bodily resistance is further lowered by being sent out to work in wet, unhealthy conditions. Further, that a reduction in rations, as threatened, would retard the restoration to health, still more, of many of these men, with a consequent reduction in the number of those available for work..

My Senior Medical Officer, (Capt. C. L. Anderson, AAMC) advises that experience has shown that men, sent out to work, before they are fully recovered from fevers, have suffered relapses, which make those men unfit for work for 3 or 4 more days, than would otherwise have been the case.

In the past week there have been 3 deaths from cholera and 1 from dysentery in this camp, and while this imposes a very heavy additional strain on my Medical Officers, every effort is being made, by all ranks, to take every precaution possible against diseases.

In Jan 1944 the majority of "A", Force was moved to Tamarkan in Thailand, where conditions in regard to food, medical supplies and working conditions improved temporarily over a period of some months, but which later again deteriorated.

The Japanese commenced sending parties back to railway maintenance camps in the jungle, and in Feb. 1945 the officers, with the exception of some medical officers, were separated from the O.R.s and the great majority of the Officers - British, Australian, American and Dutch, numbering over 3000 were concentrated in very crowded conditions in Kanburi.

This was at the stage, when the Japs were aware that the war was not going too well for them in the Pacific War theatre and accordingly, decided to keep officers and ORs well apart. In many camps in the Kanburi area deep V trenches had to be dug by Ps.O.W. of all ranks, with the soil banked up as ramparts on the side away from the huts, these trenches were guarded by machine gun posts set up in towers at each corner, the purpose was very obvious.

The officers at this time were in the process of being moved from Kanburi Camp to an unprepared camp at Nakom Nyak in batches of 400 or 500 at a time, at intervals of from 5 to 10 days, necessitating 5 or 6 days journey by rail, river and road, including a gruelling march of 47 kilometres, carrying all their own gear, plus a large amount of camp gear. The officers were expected to build the new camp, including the Japanese quarters. Five parties had already left Kanburi, and the sixth party, of which Colonel Ramsay was a member, arrived at Bangkok en route to the new camp on the night that the Japanese surrender became known.

Over the period, last days of August until October 1945, Colonel Ramsay was the Senior Allied Officer to approximately 300 British, Australian, American and Dutch Officers in Bangkok, being quartered there in the Oriental Hotel and the adjacent building of the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank. The story is set out on p.p 222/3 of "Cor" Punt's book "Kura!" that "Colonel Ramsay and Captain Hence, with seven others, were invited one night to attend a dinner in Sathorn House, offered by the leading citizens of the city of Bangkok. Transport was provided by the Japs and, as few passenger cars were available, trucks were used....one officer per truck, riding with dignity beside the driver.

Finally Colonel Ramsay and Captain Hence rose to leave.....The Jap truck drivers with the roles now reversed, were most eager to please. One, proudly remembering whom he had driven to the party, rushed up to Colonel Ramsay, pulled him by the sleeve and said, "You numba seven truck, O.K. ka?". Without a moment's thought, without a moment's hesitation, down came the natural reserve, that natural control, the natural perfect manners of a perfect gentleman. Without thinking why, Colonel Ramsay slapped the Jap - just once, hard - saying, "Next time you keirei (Salute). O.K. ka?"

In April 1944 the Japanese had submitted a questionnaire stated to have emanated from Imperial Japanese Army HQ at Tokyo consisting of some 30 odd questions, which dealt with different phases of conditions during the construction of the Burma-Thailand railway. Brig. Varley was with George Ramsay at Tamarkan Camp at the time, and after conferring with him, it was agreed that any essays would be as constructive as possible (and not be a mere list of complaints), hoping that the Japanese were really sincere in their expressed desire to know how the conditions could be bettered, in which case a candid, and restrained statement, together with suggested remedies, would have the best chance of achieving this end.

The questions were divided amongst a number of officers and their essays were carefully edited by the Brigadier Varley, Lt. Col. Anderson and Lt. Col. Ramsay.

Rohan Rivett in his book "Behind Bamboo" comments at page 270 - "I was asked by Lt. Col. Ramsay to handle the first two essays dealing with the main issues involved in our treatment along the line. In these I outlined our story since our arrival in Burma. Lt. Col. Anderson, who, as our Senior Officer, controlled the essays, asked me to tone down my expressions of opinion, although he admitted that nothing in the essay was either inaccurate or unjust. I set out to modify it, but found that this was impossible Brig. Varley, however, told me that he felt that the essay should be placed before the Aus. Govt. as, in his opinion, it covered the whole story fully and fairly and he asked for a copy of it to incorporate in his own report.

George Ramsay wrote his essay in answer to the 12th Question. - "Impressions as Commanding Officer of Ps.O.W. for railway construction work.

In the early stages at Singapore, Mergui and Tavoy the Japanese guard was composed of Japanese front-line soldiers, and generally speaking their treatment of Ps.O.W. was better than that received at the hands of the Koreans, who later formed almost entirely the administrative staffs of the Camps on the railway construction in Burma and Thailand.

In the railway construction Camps particularly the question of working figures was one of daily disputes, and often the whole camp, sometimes including hospital patients, would be paraded and the Japanese themselves would detail men, whom our own medical officers regarded as unfit to work. It was sometimes possible for my adjutant and staff, without the knowledge of the Japanese, to substitute men, who were at least considered by the medical officers, to be more fit, than those detailed by the Japanese. My policy of never admitting to being able to supply the full quota had at least some effect and never voluntarily did I supply them with the full number, that they required, as this, I knew, would result in increased numbers later. By this restriction of the Japanese demands, we were able to keep within the Camp many very sick men, who would otherwise, most certainly have been sent to work.

The Japanese authorities in charge of camps of Ps.O.W. recognised that all was not as it should be by their strenuous efforts to present all phases of P.O.W. conditions as being much better than they actually were, when cinematograph films of various camps were taken. Pictures were taken of only the best and most recently built huts, to the exclusion of the many dilapidated and dirty structures, which formed the majority. Extra shelves, cupboards, instruments and bottles and other containers of medical supplies were placed in that portion of the hospital hut being photographed, and then removed immediately afterwards. In addition, no neutral or international Red Cross observers were allowed access to any P.O.W. Camps as far as is known.

In most cases of accommodation, apart from being hopelessly inadequate, the space per man was often less than 1/3rd of that considered the minimum requirements according to Australian Army standards, and were mostly dirty, verminous and far from weather proof.

The lack of adequate hospital accommodation, facilities and medical supplies tremendously hampered the work of the Medical officers and contributed considerably to the large number of deaths.

It is considered that the practice of forcing men out to work, whom our medical officer considered to be unfitted for manual labour, combined with the lack of sufficient vitamins, in the foods supplied, and any facilities for regular rest and proper relaxation, is probably the greatest individual factor contributing to the extremely high death rate and to the large number of amputated limbs amongst Ps.O.W. It is a fact that many men suffered these hardships for several months in the most inclement weather and conditions. After every available man had been sent to the railway work, constant demands were made by the Japs for parties of additional men (numbering anything from 10 to 100) for camp work, represented as being light work, but often proving to be equally as hard as railway work.

The matter of the distribution of rations left much to be desired. Shortages of rice were felt by the Ps.O.W., but if meat, sugar, oil, eggs and the like are considered, the supply was more often than in the case of rice, irregular and spasmodic, but the Japanese camp staffs claimed quantities, out of all proportions to their numerical strength, in a very successful endeavour to ensure that their own requirements could continue to be amply met, until the arrival of the next consignment. This was possible only at the expense of the Ps.O.W., who often did not have any of one or more of these commodities for long periods at a time.

Where in some camps the total number catered for by the Japanese kitchens (including P.O.W. assistants) would not exceed 50 or 60 persons, and the number of Ps.O.W. be 2000 or more, the Japanese would often take 2 bags of sugar for their own use out of a total delivery of 3 bags, and anything from 4 to 10 of a delivery of 12 tins of oil, according to the degree of uncertainty of the date of next delivery. Similarly in the matter of meat (livestock); when the supply of beasts was regular, 4 and sometimes 5 yaks were killed daily for a camp of approximately 2000 Ps.O.W., the Japanese taking half of one of the animals. When there appeared to be any possibility of an interruption in the supply, the then existing stock in the camp was conserved for as long as possible by reducing the number to be killed each day, but whether there was 1 or 5 animals killed, the Japanese staff still had half a beast.

On the basis set out above, this meant that for varying periods, from 3 to 4 beasts per day, originally admitted to be Ps.O.W. rations, were confiscated in order to maintain the already excessive meat ration of the Japanese staff, for as long a period as possible, despite the fact that the physical efforts required of them were not in any way comparable with that expected of most Ps.O.W., and that meat formed a very important part of the staple diet of Australians in their homeland, and deemed essential for those engaged in manual labour.

Inadequate clothing and bedding supplies. Total inadequacy of satisfactory cooking and general kitchen utensils, of which there must have been ample supplies available from captured equipment. Lack of ordinary toilet requisites. Lack of any lighting facilities in most living quarters. Absence of regular rest days.

Failure to display recognised marks of identification on P.O.W. Camps visible to aircraft and the close proximity of some camps to military objectives,

There were a large number of contributory factors to high death rates in many camps. There was much dysentery, malaria, pellagra, beri beri and a number of other diseases, which were all aggravated by the lack of medical supplies, proper facilities and accommodation, actual ill-treatment by Korean and Japanese guards; long hours of work in wet conditions without having any change of clothing or boots (in many cases no boots at all); inadequate and unsuitable food, which, all combined, makes a formidable total of disabilities, under which we were forced to live. In addition to this, tropical ulcers were very prevalent. These were caused by even very slight abrasions from small flying pieces of rock, or bamboo scratches, and in very short period extended to tremendous proportions. Many of the ulcers could have been checked, had the necessary medical supplies been available.

The beating up of Ps.O.W. by guards and railway troops was often of a severe nature, the Japanese always going for the most vital parts, round the head etc. or if a P.O.W had a previous disability, such as a half-healed ulcer, swollen face or other wound, that would be the part that they would kick, punch or hit with stick or rifle.

To summarise the position as a whole is not easy, as the experiences of individuals, even of those in the same camp, may have varied considerably, due to their dependence on many factors, such as the nature of their duties, their general health and physical fitness, their mental outlook, their nervous reactions, the size of their appetites in normal times, and even perhaps the extent of their sense of humour.

For instance, those, holding positions of responsibility, were subjected to an intense mental and nervous strain, from which there was little or no respite, over long and continuous periods. These include Officers, W.O.’s, and senior N.C.O.’s in charge of working parties, who were in daily contact with Japanese; while the experience of those on administration duties varied, in accordance with the amount of direct Japanese contact which their respective duties entailed.

Again, the long hours of heavy manual labour, performed by the great majority, in hot or wet working conditions under direct Japanese supervision, assumed fearful proportions in the eyes of those less physically robust, and caused them greater physical suffering and mental anxiety, than it did to those more fitted for and/or more used to such work.

Thirdly, the mental outlook of those, who were forced by ill health to lie day after day, in some cases for months, in a bamboo and attap hospital hut in a jungle camp, with its depressing and often foetid atmosphere, receiving only such attention as a willing but depleted medical staff, without adequate facilities or medical supplies, could give them, was such as to call for the exercise of the strongest will power, if there was to be any chance of successfully combating, what must have been to them in their weakened condition, a veritable nightmare of physical suffering, aggravated by the ever present fear of interference by callous and irresponsible Japanese guards.

It is necessary however to realise the full implication of brief references to hours, types and conditions of work and to understand that these often meant long and arduous marches to and from work and then working for some rush periods from dawn of one day until 2 am on the following morning with only a few hours rest, before starting again, in germ infested mud and water, with dire results to skin abrasions etc., without adequate food, clothing, boots, sleeping accommodation, washing facilities, mosquito protection, or any ordinary amenities, and to remember that these conditions, although varying in detail and degree, existed in their main essentials for three and a half years, with special emphasis on the conditions of those engaged in manual labour on the construction and maintenance of the Burma-Thailand Railway.

George's memory is one, that will be revered always, by the veterans of the 8th Division and, especially, by the men of the 2/30 Battalion. He was indeed a "dinkum Aussie"; a true leader of men in battle conditions and in even worse circumstances; a man full of understanding of human nature and promoting affection in all his associations. He was, as we all knew, "Gentleman George".

This recital of George's good works cannot be allowed to close without revealing that he had quite some literary talent. Mrs Ramsay has said that his lecturing for the Water Board and the Snowy Mountains Authority gave scope for that talent. The demand for his services as a lecturer to small gatherings in suburbs or to big city audiences always received the same response no matter how few or how many.

As a family man he made himself endeared by the children of the family in giving free rein to his literary talents in composing small verses to accompany any birthday gift or any memorable occasion in the family and the children always looked for them.

Alan Pryde Writes:

I had the grand fortune to be associated with "Gentleman George" Ramsay from 1939 for about 40 years in all.

It is because I have known him for so long, in both peace and war-time conditions, that I feel I am justified and hopefully, able to record facts and feelings about this grand man.

Gentleman he was always to everyone. He gave me help on many occasions and saved me from the wrath or blasts of our "Big Boss" many a time.

The day after he learned of his new A.I.F. command “B. J." sent "Gentleman George" and me to Tamworth (on 13th November, 1940) to establish the camp at the Showground there and recruit personnel for the newly created 2/30 Battalion. "G.G.’s" efforts in this regard were quite a mighty job considering the circumstances prevailing, in the early War years, of recruiting induction - there was a Showground, Grandstand and cattle stalls and a couple of Toilet Blocks to accommodate 1,000 men. "You take it from here", was the official attitude. "G.G.” did just that.

I feel quite justified in believing that I was associated more closely with "G.G." over a longer period after its formation than was any other member of the 2/30 Battalion. Therefore I take the liberty of submitting the following facts to our Association Members, most of whom are well aware of them and to others, who wish to know about someone, who did a very splendid job in all the spheres, in which he engaged throughout his life.

George Ramsay served as a volunteer for much of the time between the two World Wars in the Citizens Military Forces. The E.D. (Efficiency Decoration), awarded him about 1940, records 20 years of honourable and efficient service up to that time in commissioned rank in the C.M.F. He, even by 1940, had been Second-in Command to Lt. Col. Galleghan, in the 17 Bn. C.M.F. for quite a few years, before "B.J." was given his A.I.F. Command of the 2/30 Battalion. Obviously, "B.J." decided very promptly, at that stage, just whom he wished to have alongside himself in a "real live show" on active service "G.G." and others like Noel Johnston, were his first choice.

After his discharge and his return to the Water Board in April 1946, the succeeding four years there and his subsequent fourteen years with the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority project saw a repetition of the strong initiative and leadership, that he had displayed during his active wartime service and, in particular, during the period, when he had the tremendous responsibility for the welfare of so many Prisoners-of-War on the Burma Siam Railway Line project, on which his men were engaged so compulsorily.

During the three years when many thousands of Prisoners-of-War were under "B.J.'s" care and supervision, "B.J.” made a great impact, not only on the men under his charge, but also on the Japanese custodians. All of these circumstances are well documented and fully known and appreciated by most Service Personnel, especially those, who were with "B.J." or under his direct influence during much of their service in the Forces and P.O.W. days.

When many hundreds of miles separated some groups from the main assemblage of Prisoners-of-War, the circumstances of the segregated groups rarely have been revealed as well.

If praise should be given, where praise is due, it is not only proper, but essential, that the extremely significant part played by "B.J.'s" most Senior Officers is clearly understood. During action and in subsequent Prisoner-of-War days, these Senior Officers led our Battalion with great distinction to themselves. Both in Action and in the following years of Captivity they did an incredible job in their attempts to succour the very diversified troops under their care, not in any one fixed base compound, but throughout the length of the Notorious Burma-Siam Railway Line task and other ordeals in Borneo, Malaya and Japan.

Colonel Ramsay was very definitely one of those outstanding leaders in such exacting circumstances.

When Colonel Ramsay was appointed to take over command of the 2/30 Battalion on 9th February 1942 and was in such command throughout that extremely onerous period of the Causeway Actions and the ensuing campaign on Singapore Island, his task during that time and, when escorting his men (and many others) from the final battlefields to the Changi Area Compound was extraordinarily efficiently conducted. Promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. was granted him on 13 Feb, 1942.

It was during the period, however, when he was the Senior Officer of over a thousand Ps.O.W., who were sent away as the first Working Party, to begin, what was to become, the Burma-Siam Railway Line job, that Colonel Ramsay's great personal qualities of leadership, courage, and diplomatic tact were revealed to their fullest potential.

Anyone, who has read the Appendix of "Galleghan's Greyhounds" by our own Historians, Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, will have some idea of what were the problems, which confronted this grand leader, whom we have come to refer to as "Gentleman George". The Australian War History Volume, "The Japanese Thrust", fully endorses this.

"Gentleman George", as he is so affectionately, and very appropriately known, during the whole of his time with the Battalion, seemed able to generate respect in and from our Japanese Korean overseers, equally as much as, from our own troops and allied personnel.

It would be obvious to all, who gave any thought to the circumstances, that the situations and problems facing a Senior Officer, endeavouring to get the greatest possible care for the men in his charge, under continually changing conditions and locations, would be infinitely more onerous than when static base camp conditions prevailed. The Senior Officers of all of those Working Parties, that were sent away from Changi (Singapore) Base Camp, that is A, B, C, D, F, H and J Forces and so on, had to contend with the multitude of problems arising from frequent changes of camp sites, jungle conditions, appalling health (disease and death) dilemmas. They seldom knew, if they were to be reasonably assured of a fair, decent night's sleep, having to be "on tap" should any problem arise affecting their men. At the slightest hint of our own Allied bombers being in the vicinity, Senior Officers were ordered to get their men out of lines (probably for reprisal action) should there be any damage to the Jap Program or their installations.

It must be admitted that in the Railway Line situation our captors themselves did not have very comfortable and congenial circumstances. Food supplies and other amenities were quite primitive for them, although they had the chance to ensure that the pickings, such as there were to be had, went their way.

Officers, in charge of Work Camp Groups, had to be constantly pressing, on behalf of their men, for even a meagre share of what commodities (food or stores) did reach the outpost.

It is in this regard that our own Senior Officers, people such as George Ramsay, did such an incredible and, largely unacknowledged, job. They were the sort of men, who had the wonderful attribute of knowing when to make a stand against a Japanese demand, concur in some other demand and, in consequence, recognition by the Japanese that consultation and conciliation could achieve greater all round advantages both sides, than dogmatic confrontation.

It is noted in the Official War History Volume, entitled "The Japanese Thrust", (Footnote 8, Page 551) that, "the best results seem to have been achieved by officers, who deferred to Japanese authority on minor matters concentrated on taking a definite stand on vital matters affecting the men's lives and health.

Colonel Ramsay did incredibly well in this direction. He had an unfailing knack of knowing, when to concede a little and when to make a stand against something, which he considered utterly wrong or unreasonable. Despite many changes of camps and Japanese Camp overseers, he was able to protect the men in his charge against great aggression from the captors.

Those, who experienced the Working Party conditions on the Railway construction job (and, as was almost certainly the case in Japanese P.O.W. Camps elsewhere) know that the custodial guards were almost entirely of Korean nationality. Japanese personnel despised the Koreans, "took it out on them" on any excuse, bashed and ridiculed them. It was customary in the Japanese Forces for a senior officer to slap up a subordinate and so on, down the line. Korean guards were at the lowest level of the Japanese "belting-up" hierarchy and we, Ps.O.W. were even lower - Officer slaps or belts Sergeant; Sergeant belts Corporal; then down to Senior private, lowly private and, obviously, there was the "tail end Charlie". Is it any wonder then that our boys copped the ultimate reprisals of such belted-up Korean guards?

I had the good fortune to be with Colonel Ramsay throughout the entire period of our P.O.W. days. I say "good fortune”, because I am convinced that, had it not been for his guidance and his faculty for knowing when to "give a little, demand a little", hundreds of the men, (Australians, British, Dutch and Americans), who were under his care during those days, would never have returned home, and their numbers fluctuated from the 1000 in May 1942 to 2000 in 1943 and as many as 5000 in 1945.

Whilst the foregoing has had much to say about our Patron, it is to be hoped that it will never be forgotten that Senior Officers, such as Noel Johnston, played a tremendous part in the leadership of our Battalion in the operational campaign and in subsequent leadership of P.O.W. Work Groups.

Our 2/30 Battalion was fortunate to have a driving, energetic leader for our induction to training and active service. We were equally fortunate to have had such splendid leadership from Colonel Ramsay and from Noel Johnston during the latter stages of the action, the "tied up" years and the post-war affairs of the Battalion and our Association. I am tremendously appreciative of the grand part, that they played in the fostering of our Battalion history. I am also very much aware that without good men, it is impossible to have good leaders. Throughout the active service of the Battalion, we had such courageous and discerning men. This probably accounts for the fact that a smaller percentage of our own men died, under POW conditions, than was the case with other Unit groups. We had learned discipline and we had splendid leaders, both during training, action and subsequent periods of incarceration and rehabilitation. We all owe them a tremendous debt.

Unfortunately, for quite a few years Colonel Ramsay had been virtually totally blind and physically immobilized. Such conditions were almost entirely attributable to malnutrition, which he experienced as a Prisoner-of-War. In this regard he shared the dilemma, which has been experienced by many of our Battalion and other enforced guests of the Japanese. Diabetes, heart attacks and pneumonia necessitated constant treatment and quite a few hospitalizations for him. Nevertheless, he seemed to have borne all such adversities with great fortitude.

These years must have been extremely exhausting for Mrs. Ramsay, their son, Max, and his family. "G.G." had to have somebody constantly "on deck" with him. How Mrs Ramsay bore up to it all is beyond me and also beyond the "ken" of the family, friends and relatives, with whom I have associated. But then Colonel and Mrs. Ramsay have been very much a "Together Couple" for more than half a century and still are. My wife and I had the pleasure of being guests at the family party for their Golden Wedding Anniversary in March 1976.

Mrs. Ramsay has always been a terrific "Back-Stop" for Col. Ramsay and participates in every possible sphere of the activities involved in their life together. In latter years it has fallen to Mrs Ramsay's lot to guide and escort "G.G." to the gatherings of the Battalion and the Association, and to any comment about her continued concern and care for him, she merely says, "But, he is my husband". To her no other attitude is possible in married life. Anything concerning the Bn. Association is of immense significance to him, especially our Anzac Day assembly and the Gemas gatherings at Pymble, at each of which he has loved to meet our boys and their families. Fewer things gave him as much pleasure and gratification as reminiscing about the doings of the 2/30 Battalion and our post-war Bn. Association. Nor must we forget his action year after year in providing a cake for the Party of the "Purple and Gold" Club at Christmas time.

The benefit of his character has been of some effect upon the lives of the Men of the Battalion, but he left his imprint also during the time of his Civilian Career in both the Water Board and Snowy Mountains Hydro Electric Authority and, in both a number of the present older staff recall him with considerable affection.

Occasions of "Officer Commanding" 2/30 Bn A.I.F.

As Battalion Second in Command George Ramsay had to be prepared to take over control of the Battalion on any occasion, when the C.O. was elsewhere or otherwise engaged.

So it was that, on the movement overseas, "Black Jack" was "O.C. Troops" on board the Johan Van Oldenbarnevelt, since there were other 8 Division Units on the ship, and Major Ramsay was in temporary command of the 2/30 Battalion, until Singapore was reached.

During training before the balloon went up, one of the exercises, in which the 27 Brigade was practised, was a "Defence of Kluang Aerodrome", with 2/30 Bn. guarding the aerodrome and its "B" Echelon vehicles being utilised on the runways of the drome in order, to prevent the landing of "enemy" aircraft, whilst 2/29 Battalion Troops simulated the part of paratroopers landing and attacking the defenders. "Black Jack" remained as C.O. 2/30 Bn in the exercise, and Major Ramsay had the important task of coordinating movement of vehicles on to the 'drome, their siting, and subsequent movement to counter the attacking aircraft. The exercise was important, not alone for training of Australian Troops, senior officers of 8 Aust. Div., and others of British Divisions in Malaya and of the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces were observers.

“B.J.” was away from Batu Pahat Camp on a reconnaissance with other Senior Officers of 8 Div. and "Gentleman George" was in charge, when the Codeword, which placed the Battalion on a War footing, was received, so that it was he, who set in motion those plans, which had been prepared, for the local Batu Pahat Air Strip to be guarded by a party from the Battalion, and for the Perimeter of the Camp to be patrolled by sentries.

On 15 January 1942, that day after the forward Company, took part in the first encounter by the Battalion against the enemy, with the ambush at the bridge over the Sungei Gemencheh, and it became apparent that the Japs were in strength, supported by tanks, which had not been foreseen, so soon after the bridge had been blown, it had been agreed that the Battalion would fall back at dusk, according to original planning, to a position at Gemas Bahru Estate, a Rubber Plantation on the east side of the Gemas River.

To this end Major Ramsay left in order to carry out a preliminary reconnaissance, at approx. 12.20 pm, and, owing to the reduced numbers in the "I" Section, he had none of them with him for his assistance.

His instructions had required him to proceed to the Estate carry out the "recce" of the area, and meet "B.J." at the bridge over the Gemas River after dark.

However, before he had done nothing much more than checking on buildings on the Estate, against 5th columnists, Maj. Ramsay became aware that Battalion vehicles were moving back along the Highway, well ahead of scheduled timing. He found out that the Battalion was pulling back; and that vehicles had been ordered south of Gemas town, but his first contacts could not tell him where the Troops were, nor where they were heading.

He had to find out where they were to rendezvous, and to contact the C.O. so he had Captain Tompson, O.C. Carriers, put spare personnel out of his carrier and drive him back along the road towards the Gemas Battlefield.

He learnt from W.O. Arthur Purdon, that he was with the last of the vehicles; that all troops had withdrawn; that the C.O. was marching with the Troops, so he desisted from going any further. On the return trip to Gemas Bahru Bridge a Despatch Rider from Brigade Headquarters was intercepted; the order, which he carried, was for the withdrawal of the 2/30 Bn to Fort Rose Estate, in rear of Gemas Town, and where the 2/26 Bn was in position.

On the morning of 16th Jan. it was expected that the enemy would follow up their action of the day before. Patrols from all Companies were probing the areas to front, sides and rear of their positions. In the course of such patrols troops both of 2/30 Bn and the attached Company from 2/26 Bn encountered some parties of Japs, but were able to break out of traps, although not without losses.

Up to about twelve noon of 17th Jan. there had been no large frontal attack from Japanese troops. Brigade H.Q. had planned an evacuation of the position in the Fort Rose Estate to fresh positions on the "Rubber Estates of Johore" Plantation. In accordance with this intention Brigadier Maxwell, with "Black Jack" and his Company Commanders had departed for a "recce" of this new position.

Fighting, which flared up in the afternoon, was therefore directed by "Gentleman George" in the absence of the C.O. This fighting involved the B. Coy of the 2/26 Bn under Captain Swartz temporarily attached to 2/30 Bn and, later, Platoons from B Coy of 2/30 Bn. These joined with the Queenslanders in a counter attack on the Japanese, but the latter had brought up greater numbers of reinforcements; they were using mortars and machine guns and were seen to be massing troops, as if preparing for a major attack. Captain Swartz called for Artillery support, and Maj. Ramsay gave the necessary fire task on Map Reference points nominated by Captain Swartz.

30 Battery 2/15 Artillery was supporting the Battalion. It placed its first salvo of shells in the centre of the tightly packed Japanese troops, and on some light cane buildings, where their troops were, and left a tangled mass of sprawling forms, so that they were at a distinct disadvantage.

Capt. Swartz was preparing for a flank attack on the Japs, when word was received from Brigade for the complete withdrawal from the Fort Rose Estate, beginning at 17.45 hours, with the Artillery providing covering fire from that time.

Les Hall praises the tactical ability displayed by Major Ramsay during this afternoon, whilst he was acting C.O. As Sig Platoon Sergeant, Les was at the Battalion Command Post, and says that by "Gentleman George's" decisive action there is no question but that he thwarted an enemy attack and preserved the lives of all the troops under his then command.

In Les' words, "The coolness displayed by this intrepid officer, left no doubt as to his ability to lead men in vital situations.

When at one stage in the engagement, there was no means of communicating with a forward post; one at the junction of the railway and the Estate road, where an Anti-Tank Gun was sited with crew and ammunition, and supporting cover of a section post on the Queensland Company's right forward sector, and Japanese mortar and Machine gun fire from a hill feature, known as "105", about 8000 yards forward of the Company line, had been strafing the post, and one bomb scored a direct hit on the ammunition truck, harboured close by, setting the truck on fire, so that the crew feared that it would blow up, Battalion H.Q. believed that the post had been over-run by an enemy patrol, and that it was deemed necessary to shell the position.

Major Ramsay weighed the possibilities and said, "Gentlemen, we must assume the section is lost. Unless we attack the post with artillery fire, "C" Company may be wiped out. My information is, the Japs are massing in that area for an attack on the left flank.

Turning to Major Ball, he gave him the map reference. A few moments later 30 Battery 2/15 Artillery laid down a barrage on the post. Observers reported the success of the shelling; the destroying of the Anti-Tank Gun; the complete demolition of the ammunition truck; the breaking up of the concentration of the Japs and the staving off of the expected attack on the left flank.

It was learnt later that the Anti-Tank Gun Commander, fearing that the "ammo" truck would blow up, with consequent loss of life for those in its vicinity and damage to other equipment had already given orders for abandonment of all equipment, after it had been rendered unfit for further use, and had joined his men in with the infantry troops. Major Ramsay of course without knowledge of the decision, had to weigh preservation of the men and equipment there against preservation of the whole of his nearby Company, even Battalion, in coming to his own decision."

(One might say that, at the time, Major Ramsay's long training as a C.M.F. Officer had prepared him to weigh possibilities of any moment of action, and that his words to Major Ball were as though he were speaking to an umpire in a training exercise back in Australia; and yet, in the heat of battle, nothing is so hard on any commander than virtually signing the death warrant of his own men. Ed.)

The movement of the 2/30 Bn. back from Fort Rose Estate on the 17th January, commencing at 17.45 hours, as previously recorded in the instructions to Captain Swartz, was to a position about a mile south west of the town of Batu Anum. In the continued absence of the C.O., it was under the supervision of Maj Ramsay.

The Battalion's next move back, this time from the "Rubber Estates of Johore", to which it had has to advance, to the right flank of the 2/26 Battalion, because of the situation, which had been created in the Muar area, was also under the supervision of Major Ramsay on the 18th January. In this case the roads were considered impassable for foot troops, and the route had to be along the railway line. The Japs were shelling Batu Anum heavily, and as the Battalion had to pass through the Railway Gates, there was some danger, if any bunching were to occur. Major Ramsay had studied the timing of the enemy shelling, and stood at the crossing, urging the troops to hurry, as he counted the minutes, that he believed, were left before the Jap Artillery opened up again. The last troops moved through on the run, thereby clearing the death trap successfully, but they had to be hurried along the line, in case of any scattering of shells or switch in aim before Major Ramsay was satisfied that they could be allowed to rest.

It was during the night of the 25th January that 2/30 Bn. pulled back from Ayer-Hitam. Trucks of 4th Reserve Motor Transport picked them up from the rendezvous and transported them to near the 40½ mile peg from Johore Bahru, at Simpang Rengam. Major Ramsay, however, as with 2 i/cs of other Battalions, had to report to 8 Div. HQ in order to make reconnaissances of Singapore Island positions. He returned to Bn HQ during the night of 27th January with information regarding the Battalion's Island positions and, after a conference between the Brigadier and the C.O., lasting until the early hours of the morning, George returned to Singapore for further Divisional instructions.

It was while proceeding along one of the Singapore Streets towards one of the rendezvous for these briefings, that George owed his life and that of his driver, Arnie Ainsworth, to his long training in the C.M.F., in that, although they had not heard the sound of any air raid sirens, the fact that road and foot paths in front of them were absolutely devoid of people spelt the need for care. The car was stopped against the kerb; they alighted; then observed a flight of bombers over head. The bombs from those planes landed ahead of them, at the spot, where their car would have been, if George Ramsay's instincts had not warned him of danger. He was spared and, as indicated on page 5 took over command of 2/30 Bn on 9/2/1942, when "Black Jack" was ordered to Hospital with his ear trouble.

Johnny Kreckler gives an instance of Col. Ramsay's care for the men with him on "A" Force.

"On arrival at the 75 kilo Camp, we were informed that the daily work expectation had been increased to 1.75 metres per man. It had. been steadily rising from .25 metres per man at the 26 kilo Camp.

When we came to the work site for my group at this Camp, we found that the day's work for the Group had been pegged out in advance. After some discussion amongst ourselves I waited for the right opportunity to present itself and then readjusted pegs, to allow for less than what the Japs required, and continued to do so daily for quite a time. It worked so well, the Jap guard never twigged, what was being done. Of course the men made sure to extend the work, so that it looked as though a full day's work had been done.

However, one day up came the little Jap Engineer, who proceeded to busy himself with measuring the work face. At about knock-off time the bubble burst; from his arithmetic he worked out - so many men - so many days = so many metres, but from the position of the pegs and the quantity of work accomplished, he could see that the Group was nowhere near its task expectation at that rate of 1.75 metres per man.

As I was the Group Leader, I copped the bashing and was marched back to camp under guard, whilst the men were made to continue working.

Col. Ramsay saw the manner of my return and enquired what was the reason. It was a very shame faced Johnny Kreckler, who fronted up to him and explained what had been going on. George told me in no uncertain terms, what a damn fool I had been, and pointed out that it was his responsibility to care for the welfare of the men and see that they were not made to suffer unnecessarily, and he looked for his Officers to back him up, but the result of my activities was that, through my stupidity, my men were still working, when others had returned and been fed, and we did not know what punishment they might be receiving out on the job, because I was not there.

For many hours we both stood at the Camp Entrance waiting on their return. I was feeling as small as sixpence, as the saying goes, as we waited. Then, out of the darkness, we heard Aussie voices, and, as they came nearer, we noticed them get into some military order, with shovels etc at the slope, and, as they marched in, they were singing a variation of that old song, "Oh Johnnie! Oh Johnnie! Heavens Above! Oh Johnnie! Oh Johnnie, How you can love! "

It was good to hear and see them. They were all well. But what was better, was to hear George say, "Kreckler, the Men don't seem to be worried, why should we? Kreckler, will you please forget what I had to say earlier".

I shall never forget the great personal concern, that he had for those men. No Father could have shown more worried countenance. They were his men and he felt it ever so keenly.

I shall never forget the man nor the occasion.

Jack Kreckler."

Memo to all Readers of "Makan".

We have given you a "SALUTE TO GEORGE RAMSAY".

May we please ask that all of you give him "Your Salute", in a simple message to him, so as to show him that he is in your thoughts. Just a couple of lines in a letter or on a card will enlighten his day.

Please address it to him at the Nursing Home, "GREENWOOD CONVALESCENT HOMES, NORMANHURST, 2076; to his home, or care of the Editor.

Also, if any one has an anecdote relating to him, or has a tribute, which they would like to pay him, please do not hesitate to send it along to your scribe.

Yours Sincerely, Ed.

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